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Criminal law theory is laden with faulty assumptions about misdemeanors. 
This Article summarizes five key mistaken assumptions—“misdemeanor 
myths”—that distort misdemeanor processing: (1) the stakes are small, 
(2) criminal procedure matters, (3) prosecutors maximize sentences, (4) pleas 
are informed, and (5) the sentence matters most. In addition, it examines 
emerging relief efforts, such as expungements, that offer the promise of reducing 
disproportionate penalties. It argues that while certain initiatives hold the 
promise of reform, they are too often laden with onerous procedural and 
substantive hurdles. As a result, they offer little more than palliative relief to the 
rare few. They perpetrate the procedural hassle that characterizes misdemeanor 
courts, rather than offering relief from it. Conceptually, this approach gets it 
backwards. It gives the misdemeanor system far more credit than is warranted 
in leading to outcomes that do not offend basic principles of proportionality and 
procedural fairness. This Article argues that relief efforts should focus on 
 
 Assistant Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law. Thank you to Gerry 
Leonard, David Rossman, and the Boston University Law Review for the opportunity to 
participate in an outstanding symposium. I am grateful to Jessica Eaglin, Ingrid Eagly, 
Brandon Garrett, Irene Joe, Margaret Colgate Love, and participants in the Misdemeanor 
Machinery: The Hidden Heart of the American Criminal Justice System conference held at 
Boston University School of Law for thoughtful feedback on prior drafts. Lucas Fortier of the 
Boston University Law Review provided excellent editorial assistance. 
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alleviating the well-documented systemic failures of the misdemeanor system, 
rather than assuming that the state has a legitimate penal rationale for imposing 
collateral penalties in the first place. 
INTRODUCTION 
Misdemeanors have a proportionality problem. Minor misdemeanors can 
trigger massive collateral consequences, often without adequate notice or 
meaningful process.1 Outcomes systemically appear arbitrary, disproportionate, 
and procedurally unfair. At the same time, because proportionality doctrine—
like much of criminal law doctrine—focuses on the formal penalty, it misses the 
impact of collateral consequences.2 There is a profound disconnect between the 
lived experience of misdemeanants and the legal doctrines that govern the 
criminal law. 
This Article has two aims. First, it summarizes the following key faulty 
assumptions—“misdemeanor myths”—that distort the misdemeanor system: 
(1) the stakes are small, (2) criminal procedure matters, (3) prosecutors 
maximize sentences, (4) pleas are informed, and (5) the sentence matters most. 
Second, it considers the potential for relief efforts to address the structural 
failures of the misdemeanor system. Important initiatives, such as certificates of 
relief, expungements, and prosecutorial policies hold the promise of addressing 
disproportionate consequences. Too often, however, relief initiatives are 
encumbered by a daunting array of procedural and substantive hurdles. These 
initiatives appear to assume that penalties are justified, rather than questioning 
whether the use of the state’s law enforcement power comports with core 
principles of proportionality and procedural fairness.  
This Article argues that this approach gets it backwards. It shifts the burden 
to the defendant to seek relief, rather than focusing on whether the state has 
demonstrated a sufficient justification for triggering harm. As a result, some 
 
1 By collateral consequences, I am referring to civil penalties triggered by criminal arrests 
and convictions, such as loss of work or deportation. For a sampling of recent contributions 
to the literature on collateral consequences, see, for example, JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL 
CRIMINAL RECORD 4 (2015); MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & CECELIA 
KLINGELE, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND 
PRACTICE § 1.2 (2016); Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the 
Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012) (arguing that idea of “civil 
death” has reemerged in United States due to increased collateral consequences for those 
convicted of felonies and misdemeanors); Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 
DUKE L.J. 1381 (2018) (analyzing how collateral consequences contribute to 
overcriminalization); Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 
2015 WIS. L. REV. 321, 325-26 (discussing the impact of criminal records). 
2 See, e.g., Proportionality (Disproportional or Proportional or Proportionate), BOUVIER 
LAW DICTIONARY (desk ed. 2012) (“The punishment for a crime should be proportionate to 
the harm committed by the criminal. Thus, crimes of similar harm should have similar 
punishment.”). 
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relief efforts offer little more than palliative relief for the rare few. Even as they 
hold out the promise of relief, they reinforce the assumption that the 
misdemeanor process as a general matter is fair, and that the harm misdemeanors 
impose is necessary to fulfill a legitimate penal purpose, such as deterrence or 
retribution. 
This Article argues for reframing relief efforts to address the misdemeanor 
myths. The problem with misdemeanors is not just that the system lends itself to 
abuse by bad actors, such as police officers who make unwarranted arrests. 
Rather, even when police and prosecutors pursue justified, lawful, and desirable 
misdemeanor charges, they lack the ability to regulate whether arrest and 
conviction records trigger deeply disproportionate civil penalties. Law 
enforcement has, in effect, abdicated responsibility for regulating key aspects of 
the harm that stems from misdemeanors. 
Relief efforts should take these dynamics into account. Rather than assuming 
that relief is only warranted in exceptional cases, the goal ought to be to focus 
on how a “typical” misdemeneant experiences the process, including through 
empirical information about delays in misdemeanor courts, availability of 
defense counsel, and evidence that even low-level contact with the criminal 
justice system triggers significant noncriminal penalties. Relief efforts should be 
informed by research demonstrating that low-level arrests and convictions 
systemically trigger massive consequences, including in ways that are not 
apparent at the time of an arrest or conviction.3 The goal should be to make more 
avenues of relief routine and unfettered, rather than sporadic and discretionary.4 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes five mistaken 
assumptions about the criminal justice system that pervade misdemeanor 
processing. Part II discusses how relief efforts, such as expungements, pardons, 
certificates of relief, prosecutorial policies, and sentencing decisions, risk 
narrowing the scope of reform by imposing unnecessary restrictions. Part III 
discusses how reform efforts could be reframed. In particular, it calls for a 
 
3 See, e.g., Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 
34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1754 (2013) (“For many immigrants, a conviction for a minor 
offense, despite resulting in minimal punitive consequences under state law, leads to 
detention, deportation, and bars to reentry.”); Jeffrey Fagan & Elliott Ash, New Policing, New 
Segregation: From Ferguson to New York, 106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 33, 36 (2017) (discussing 
evolution of “low-level offenses” into “criminal records with lasting consequences”); Jenny 
Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal 
Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 284 (2011) (discussing “serious hidden consequences” 
often attached to misdemeanors, despite legal penalties that appear to be lower). 
4 This approach reflects Alexander Hamilton’s view that unfettered access to pardons is 
necessary to avoid unnecessary harm. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(“Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning 
should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of every country 
partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of 
unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.”). 
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renewed focus on whether the state has demonstrated a legitimate penal rationale 
for penalties triggered by low-level contact with the criminal justice system. 
I. FIVE MISDEMEANOR MYTHS 
This Part draws on recent literature to summarize five key mistaken 
assumptions—the “misdemeanor myths”—that distort misdemeanor justice. 
A. Myth #1: The Stakes Are Small 
Sentencing is premised on the idea that crimes are graded by severity, with 
the least significant triggering the smallest penalty. From this perspective, 
misdemeanor stakes appear small. Misdemeanors, after all, are frequently 
punished with little to no prison time.5 
The criminal justice system conveys the perceived low stakes in myriad ways. 
Misdemeanors often involve common conduct—driving with a suspended 
license and other traffic offenses, marijuana possession, minor assault, and 
minor theft.6 Low-level public order offenses typically “lack robust mens rea 
requirements,” meaning that they are designed to ease the path of prosecution.7 
They are staffed in many cases by the least experienced lawyers or even with no 
lawyers at all.8 The cases are considered “disposable” in every sense of the word: 
 
5 Misdemeanors are typically defined as punishable by a maximum of one year in prison, 
but they frequently have much shorter sentences. See, e.g., ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA 
N. BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE 
WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (2009), 
https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=20808 [https://per 
ma.cc/Y4X9-5PZJ]; Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, in 1 ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE: A 
REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 73, 75 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), 
http://academyforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/5_Reforming-Criminal-Justice_V 
ol_1_Misdemeanors.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8UV-XX3U]. 
6 BORUCHOWITZ, BRINK & DIMINO, supra note 5, at 11 (discussing common misdemeanor 
offenses). As Megan Stevenson and Sandra Mayson’s contribution to this symposium 
illustrates, types of misdemeanor offenses vary significantly across jurisdiction. Megan 
Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731, 738-
40 (2018) (noting significant variation in misdemeanor processing and describing 
“misdemeanors” as an “amorphous” category). 
7 Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1358-59 (2012). A joint 
study by the Heritage Foundation and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
describes and criticizes the erosion of mens rea requirements by congressional legislation 
passed in 2005 to 2006. See generally BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, WITHOUT 
INTENT: HOW CONGRESS IS ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW 
(2010), https://www.nacdl.org/report/withoutintent/PDF/ [https://perma.cc/MCA4-9JAX]. 
8 Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738, 743 
(2017) (discussing lack of resources to fund public defenders); BORUCHOWITZ, BRINK & 
DIMINO, supra note 5, at 14-15 (discussing frequency of plea bargains for misdemeanor cases 
without counsel, despite Supreme Court’s ruling that “persons accused of misdemeanors have 
a right to court-appointed counsel”). 
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lawyers are trained to dispose of them quickly, and defendants themselves have 
powerful perceived incentives to resolve them quickly.9 Defendants routinely 
make the calculated decision that the best outcome is a quick guilty plea.10 
Although misdemeanors constitute the bulk of the actual work of state courts—
meaning that most prosecutors and defense attorneys will spend their days 
handling them—criminal law courses and academic literature give them short 
shrift.11 The standard criminal law course spends a month on homicide; it often 
omits misdemeanors entirely. 
All of this creates the impression that the stakes are low. As a body of research 
now demonstrates, this impression is wrong, and it is wrong on many levels. 
Misdemeanors are significant if only for their scale, with an estimated thirteen 
million cases filed each year.12 Although mass incarceration tends to dominate 
conversations about criminal justice reform, most defendants will never serve a 
formal criminal sentence in prison.13 Jail time, however, is another story; many 
misdemeanants are jailed or face the threat of jail time while their cases are 
pending.14 
Low-level arrests can trigger anxiety, stress, and embarrassment. Defendants 
who want their day in court—who want to hold the prosecution to its burden of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt—can face a long, hassling process of repeated, 
stigmatizing court dates.15 
Steep collateral consequences also raise the stakes. Misdemeanor arrests and 
convictions trigger a patchwork of penalties. Minor offenses may lead to hefty 
 
9 Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
319, 345 (2012) (noting that misdemeanors are commonly deemed to be “disposable” because 
they are perceived as unimportant). 
10 See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING 
CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979); Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal 
Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 
931, 952-53 (1983) (discussing “process costs” of misdemeanor court as leading to quick 
pleas). 
11 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
513-14 (2001) (noting that criminal law courses focus on small number of core serious 
offenses, but “everything else . . . dominates criminal codes”). 
12 Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 6, at 737. 
13 Natapoff, supra note 7, at 1320 (summarizing data estimating that misdemeanors 
outstrip felony prosecutions ten to one). 
14 Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of 
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 732-33 (2017) (reporting that fifty-
three percent of Harris County, Texas, misdemeanants are detained for more than one week 
pre-trial and thirty-five percent of New York City misdemeanor defendants spend more than 
one week in pretrial detention). 
15 See FEELEY, supra note 10, at 199-243 (describing “process costs” of being 
misdemeanor defendant in New Haven, Connecticut). 
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civil penalties, such as deportation.16 These penalties are relatively new, and they 
are ubiquitous.17 They are the product of technological changes that allow arrest 
data to be shared rapidly, legal rules that permit employers and others to access 
criminal record databases, and statutory rules that mandate civil penalties based 
on arrests and convictions. 
Until relatively recently, someone who wanted to access a criminal record had 
to go to a courthouse and seek out a paper file. That world is gone. Today, arrest 
information is rapidly transmitted and widely shared.18 This makes the impact 
of criminal records all the more difficult to control. Criminal record information 
is notoriously unreliable.19 It often contains incomplete information about 
whether charges were dismissed.20 
Unlike criminal penalties, civil penalties do not purport to track the severity 
of the criminal offense. Low-level arrests and convictions can trigger significant 
collateral consequences, such as sex offender registration, license suspension, 
pension loss, loss of public housing, and deportation.21 Some of these penalties 
are imposed by civil regulatory agencies, while others are imposed by private 
actors, such as employers.22 This dynamic means that even old or minor arrests 
and convictions can pose a barrier to accessing and retaining work. The 
consequences of a mere arrest—much less a misdemeanor conviction—can be 
severe and last long after any criminal penalty is complete. 
 
16 Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1208-09 (2016); 
Roberts, supra note 3, at 297-300. 
17 See, e.g., BORUCHOWITZ, BRINK & DIMINO, supra note 5, at 12 (highlighting expansion 
of collateral consequences for misdemeanors in recent decades). 
18 JACOBS, supra note 1, at 56 (highlighting recent movement to coordinate and manage 
court records); MADELINE NEIGHLY & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP’T L. PROJECT, 
WANTED: ACCURATE FBI BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 3 (2013), http://www. 
nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/Report-Wanted-Accurate-FBI-Background-Checks-Empl 
oyment.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4AY-PEF3]. 
19 NEIGHLY & EMSELLEM, supra note 18, at 3 (reporting that fifty percent of criminal 
records in FBI database were incomplete as of 2006). 
20 MARINA DUANE ET AL., CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS: IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT AND 
RECIDIVISM 5 (2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88621/criminal-
background-checks-impact-on-employment-and-recidivism.pdf [https://perma.cc/PBT7-NG 
SH] (discussing inconsistencies in FBI criminal records database and their harm to 
prospective employees); NEIGHLY & EMSELLEM, supra note 18, at 3; Adam Liptak, Criminal 
Records Erased by Courts Live to Tell Tales, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at A1 (discussing 
prevalence of expunged criminal records in background checks by employers). 
21 Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 826-44 (2015) (discussing use 
of arrest information “as a screening or audit mechanism”); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is 
Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea 
Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 176, 179-80, 182-83 (2009). 
22 Jain, supra note 21, at 826-44 (discussing role of regulatory agencies and employers). 
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B. Myth #2: Criminal Procedure Matters 
Criminal procedure treats an arrest as the starting point on the path toward 
trial. Our legal system distinguishes between mere arrest and conviction. It 
erects procedural constraints designed to guard against government overreach, 
to require prosecutors to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, to provide for 
speedy trials, and to provide for access to counsel. 
None of this amounts to much in misdemeanor courts. First, arrests alone 
trigger significant collateral consequences. Arrests alone can trigger deportation 
for unauthorized immigrants, eviction from public housing, or loss of work.23 
The “discretion that matters” is the discretion to arrest.24 
Second, the procedural hurdles meant to ensure a fair process either do not 
exist or do not work as intended in the misdemeanor context. Misdemeanants 
get a watered-down version of the doctrinal protections that apply to felonies. 
Defendants are not entitled to counsel or jury trials in all low-level cases.25 Even 
when defendants are entitled to counsel, financial and other hurdles make 
effective legal counsel inaccessible as a practical matter.26 Many jurisdictions 
charge fees for court-appointed attorneys.27 Overworked defense attorneys—in 
egregious cases, representing upwards of two thousand clients per year—
provide no meaningful advice.28 Misdemeanor courts are too often plagued by 
delays, meaning that defendants who want their day in court face repeated 
postponements. The upshot of all this is that many defendants choose to waive 
their right to counsel and plead guilty as quickly as possible.29 Defendants 
 
23 Id. at 826-44. 
24 Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, 
State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1829 (2011). 
25 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (holding that there is no right to counsel 
for misdemeanants not sentenced to incarceration); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-
62 (1968) (holding that there is no right to jury trial in petty cases); see also BORUCHOWITZ, 
BRINK & DIMINO, supra note 5, at 9 (discussing how, in practice, misdemeanants frequently 
do not have meaningful access to effective counsel). 
26 AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 8-15 
(2004), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_ 
defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S32S-R5NU] (“[L]iterally thousands of accused poor persons who are 
unable to afford counsel routinely are denied, either entirely or in part, meaningful 
representation.”). 
27 Id. at 12-13 (discussing consequences for indigent defendants who could not pay legal 
fees). 
28 BORUCHOWITZ, BRINK & DIMINO, supra note 5, at 9 (“In Chicago, Atlanta and Miami, 
defenders carry more than 2,000 misdemeanor cases per year.”). 
29 FEELEY, supra note 10, at 187 (explaining why “time, effort, and expense of going to 
trial are overwhelming” for “vast majority of defendants”); Alschuler, supra note 10, at 951-
52 (discussing process costs related to misdemeanor convictions that may induce defendants 
to seek plea agreements). 
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systematically make the rational decision to minimize the length of their 
experiences with the process, rather than attempt to seek adjudication. 
C. Myth #3: Prosecutors Maximize Sentences 
Because our criminal justice system is a system of pleas, criminal law scholars 
frequently view prosecutors as the most powerful actors in the system.30 
Prosecutors decide whether and when to pursue charges, and they control to a 
large degree how long a case is pending.31 They are the ultimate arbiters in many 
criminal cases.32 
Criminal dispositions provide an important way to evaluate prosecutorial 
decisionmaking. High conviction rates and relatively long sentences offer a 
window into how prosecutors exercise their discretion. This window, however, 
offers only a partial view into misdemeanor processing. For one, prosecutors 
also exercise important control over the misdemeanor clock—the time a case is 
pending.33 As Professor Issa Kohler-Hausmann develops, prosecutors in New 
York courts make reasoned decisions to keep arrests open and require 
defendants to appear repeatedly in court.34 This process allows law enforcement 
to exercise “control” over defendants “without conviction.”35 
Prosecutors in some cases also control collateral consequences. They gather 
information about civil penalties, and they appropriate those penalties as a form 
of punishment.36 They exercise discretion in ways designed to ensure that a 
defendant gets deported, registers as a sex offender or loses the right to carry a 
firearm.37 
Civil penalties triggered by low-level convictions can further strengthen the 
prosecutors’ bargaining power. When prosecutors lack the evidence to pursue 
 
30 See Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass 
Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1-2, 9-10, 13-14), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2930116 [https://perma.cc/T7UG-Z6G 
D] (summarizing academic literature describing prosecutors as most important criminal law 
actors and arguing that prosecutors have important limits on their power); Máximo Langer, 
Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in 
American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 224 n.2 (2006) (observing that some 
scholars view prosecutors as “primary adjudicators of the American criminal justice system” 
and making distinction between coercive and noncoercive pleas). See generally ANGELA J. 
DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2007) (discussing 
power of prosecutorial discretion and its potential for abuse). 
31 DAVIS, supra note 30, at 19-42. 
32 Id. at 5. 
33 See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 
AM. J. SOC. 351, 381 (2013). 
34 Id. at 374, 378-79. 
35 Id. at 351. 
36 See Jain, supra note 16, at 1216 n.105. 
37 See id. at 1221-23 (discussing “collateral enforcement” model). 
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steeper criminal charges, they may leverage the threat of collateral consequences 
to induce pleas. When low-level charges are redundant and trigger vastly 
different collateral consequences, prosecutors may selectively seek out penalties 
such as deportation or loss of work. They appropriate collateral consequences as 
a form of punishment. 
However, this approach, which I have described elsewhere as the “collateral 
enforcement” model, is not the whole story.38 Prosecutors, at times, have a 
vested interest in preventing collateral consequences.39 Some prosecutors view 
collateral consequences as disproportionate, criminogenic, damaging to their 
relationship with the community they serve, or otherwise undesirable.40 These 
prosecutors seek to ameliorate the impact of collateral consequences. They view 
the enmeshed civil and criminal penalties as undermining their ultimate goal of 
promoting public safety. 
Prosecutors who take a “collateral mitigation” approach face important 
constraints in their ability to ameliorate undesired civil consequences.41 Some 
collateral consequences are triggered at the time of arrest, so prosecutors may 
not know about them. Many collateral consequences are uncertain. They are 
codified in different statutes—federal, state, and local. Some are imposed by 
private actors who rely on background checks.42 Collateral consequences may 
not be possible to predict at the time a criminal case is resolved. Obtaining the 
relevant information can be time-consuming and lie well outside the institutional 
competence of any given prosecutor. 
 
38 Id. 
39 Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 718-19 (2002) (“Identifying and 
explaining collateral consequences to the prosecutor or court may influence the decision to 
bring charges at all.”); Jain, supra note 16, at 1215 (“[I]nformed prosecutors have powerful 
structural incentives to respond to collateral consequences.”). 
40 Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 245, 
266 (2016) (describing how some prosecutors take “fair punishment” approach that 
recognizes deportation as form of punishment); Jain, supra note 16, at 1215-20 (describing 
“collateral mitigation” model); Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary 
Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (discussing how law enforcement agencies in 
“sanctuary cities” view immigrant protective policies as necessary to promote public safety); 
see also Brief of Amici Curiae Current and Former Prosecutors and Law Enforcement Leaders 
in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Prelminary Injunction at 2, California v. Sessions, No. 
3:17-cv-04701 (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 29, 2017), ECF No. 46-1 (explaining that when 
“relationship of trust is missing—as it is when people believe that contacting police or 
cooperating with prosecutors could lead to deportation for themselves or others—community 
policing breaks down and the entire community is harmed”). 
41 See Jain, supra note 16, at 1215-16 (“In the collateral mitigation approach, prosecutors 
structure the plea to minimize the likelihood of a collateral sanction. If a prosecutor is aware 
of the potential collateral consequence . . . then the prosecutor exercises her discretion to 
modify the charges or drop them altogether.”). 
42 See generally DUANE ET AL., supra note 20. 
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Even when prosecutors are aware of undesired collateral consequences, 
responses may require compromising other important interests. Prosecutors who 
take collateral consequences into account at the time of the plea agreement may 
have to choose whether to seek less severe charges than they believe are merited 
or to impose a fitting criminal punishment that triggers a disproportionate 
collateral consequence.43  
Thus, particularly when evaluating whether and when to pursue low-level 
charges that trigger civil penalties, prosecutors balance a host of considerations 
other than formal sentences. Prosecutors also consider, and at times consciously 
influence, whether a defendant gets deported, keeps a professional license, or 
remains in public housing.44 They exercise discretion in ways that cannot be 
evaluated simply by looking at relatively short sentences or even conviction 
rates. To the extent criminal law scholars and policymakers look primarily at 
sentences and dispositions, they miss an important aspect of prosecutorial 
discretion in the misdemeanor context. 
D. Myth #4: Pleas Are Informed 
Prior to entering a guilty plea, defendants should, at a minimum, understand 
the stakes. Pleas should be voluntary, knowing, and entered with effective 
assistance of counsel.45 In practice, however, defendants routinely agree to pleas 
without understanding the stakes. 
For one, aside from mandatory deportation, defense attorneys do not have a 
Sixth Amendment obligation to inform defendants if their guilty plea will trigger 
serious noncriminal penalties.46 While in recent years, defense attorneys, 
prosecutors and judges have made systemic efforts to learn about collateral 
consequences, the misdemeanor plea bargaining system remains plagued with 
bad information.47 The misdemeanor plea bargaining system remains plagued 
with bad information. It is simply not possible for defendants to be fully 
 
43 Some prosecutors address this dynamic by requiring defendants to agree to a stiffer 
criminal penalty to “compensate” for a plea that avoids a collateral consequence. Jain, supra 
note 16, at 1244 n.157 (discussing “counterbalance model” and citing examples of “upward 
pleas” designed to reduce or eliminate collateral consequences). 
44 See, e.g., Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 560-61 
(2013) (discussing this dynamic in deportation context). 
45 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (holding that guilty pleas “not only 
must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the 
relevant circumstances and likely consequences”). 
46 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that “counsel must inform 
her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation”); Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the 
Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 
1117, 1137-48 (2011) (discussing Supreme Court’s doctrinal acknowledgment that plea 
bargaining is norm). 
47 See Jain, supra note 16, at 1211-22 (discussing “holistic,” “community-centered,” and 
“participatory” defense strategies that “incorporate collateral consequences”). 
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informed about potential collateral consequences at the time of their pleas.48 
That is because civil regulatory agencies, private actors, and others also have 
significant discretion over collateral consequences. Public housing providers, 
for instance, may deny housing to those with criminal records, even when they 
are not statutorily required to do so.49 Immigration enforcement officials have 
significant discretion about whether or not to trigger deportation after certain 
types of convictions.50 Private actors also exercise discretion.51 Defendants have 
limited information about their future goals. Career and educational plans can 
change, and an old or dated conviction can suddenly become a barrier to 
employment. Because a criminal record can be “eternal,” it can be impossible to 
know with certainty what all the future collateral consequences could be at the 
time of the plea.52 
E. Myth #5: The Sentence Matters Most 
Criminal sanctions are meant to be the most severe type of punishment. In 
practice, however, civil penalties triggered by arrests and convictions may 
matter far more to any given defendant. Precisely because collateral 
consequences carry so much weight, defendants and prosecutors systematically 
fashion “upward” pleas to account for noncriminal penalties. In these pleas, 
defendants make the informed decision to trade a more severe criminal sentence 
for an outcome that seeks to minimize a particular noncriminal collateral 
 
48 Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 25 CRIM. JUST. 21, 22 (2010) (“[T]here are legitimate practical objections to 
requiring defense counsel to tell clients about the universe of legal consequences of 
conviction. These consequences tend to be scattered randomly throughout a jurisdiction’s 
code and regulations, and criminal defense lawyers are generally unfamiliar with them.”). 
49 See generally AUSTIN/TRAVIS CTY. REENTRY ROUNDTABLE, LOCKED OUT: CRIMINAL 
HISTORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING IN AUSTIN & TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 
(2016), http://www.reentryroundtable.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Criminal-Backgroun 
d-White-Paper.final_.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XLC-SWR4]; MARIE CLAIRE TRAN LEUNG, 
SHRIVER CTR., WHEN DISCRETION MEANS DENIAL: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL 
RECORDS BARRIERS TO FEDERALLY SUBSIDIZED HOUSING (2015), http://povertylaw.org/files/ 
docs/WDMD-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BLP-USLU]. 
50 Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Immigration Status 
and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1441 (2011) (“Defense counsel needs to 
know not only whether his client is a noncitizen, but also the details of his client’s status and 
what is likely to happen if his client is convicted of a particular offense.”). 
51 Chin & Love, supra note 48, at 26 (explaining that “public and private actors 
increasingly have the practical ability to apply and enforce collateral consequences of criminal 
conviction”). 
52 See generally JACOBS, supra note 1. 
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consequence.53 The goal of the defense attorney is to minimize the penalty—
civil or criminal—that matters most to the defendant.54  
 
This dynamic disrupts the idea of proportionality in sentencing,55 which 
assumes that there is a single way of grading crimes, with less severe crimes 
triggering less severe penalties. In practice, however, informed parties engage 
in multi-dimensional plea bargaining, taking into account the full range of 
penalties—civil and criminal—triggered by a particular plea.56 An informed 
defendant’s goal is to minimize whatever penalty matters most. 
II. EMERGING RELIEF EFFORTS 
In recent years, important reform initiatives have sought to address the scope 
of the misdemeanor system. These approaches take a number of interrelated 
forms. One approach is misdemeanor decriminalization, referring to a regulatory 
practice that reduces the penalties for certain low-level offenses.57 Another 
approach is reducing the number of statutorily-mandated collateral 
consequences. A third approach is somewhat of a middle ground: It focuses on 
providing selective relief from disproportionate penalties, such as through 
 
53 See Eagly, supra note 40, at 306 (arguing that some prosecutors take approach of 
“exacting a premium” and seek criminal sentence above and beyond what they would 
normally seek in “exchange” for plea that avoids deportation); Jain, supra note 16, at 1244 
n.157 (discussing “counterbalance model” and citing examples of “upward pleas” designed 
to reduce or eliminate collateral consequences); see also Bibas, supra note 46, at 1130 
(discussing erosion of distinctions between civil and criminal penalties). 
54 See, e.g., Thea Johnson, Measuring the Creative Plea Bargain, 92 IND. L.J. 901, 919 
(2017) (discussing how defense attorneys have to determine whether plea bargain is in client’s 
best interests, taking into account “client-specific” preferences, rather than seeking minimal 
criminal penalty); McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic 
Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. 
L.J. 795, 812-14 (2011) (explaining that  to best assist their clients, attorneys must inform 
clients of all options and consequences of taking plea bargains); Robin Steinberg & David 
Feige, Cultural Revolution: Transforming the Public Defender’s Office, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 123, 123-24 (2004) (contrasting how traditional defense attorney focuses on 
keeping client out of incarceration, while holistic approach is more focused on what is best 
for client overall). 
55 See Bibas, supra note 46, at 1131 (explaining how distinctions between sentences, 
deportation, or civil confinements are becoming increasingly “arbitrary” as defendants “might 
care much more about [deportation or civil confinement], and the lawyers might well trade 
off criminal against civil consequences via plea bargaining to make the overall penalties fit 
the crime”). 
56 Id. 
57 See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 
1055 (2015) (explaining that misdemeanor decriminalization is not same as legalization, and 
discussing strategy of decriminalization and its pitfalls). 
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expungements, certificates of relief, or prosecutorial policies designed to address 
disproportionate collateral consequences.  
This Part focuses on initiatives that fall within the third strategy. It first 
examines how individual narratives have played an important role in illustrating 
the stakes and explaining the need for reform. It then cautions against reform 
strategies that focus narrowly on individual circumstances. The risk is that 
reform initiatives appear designed to provide relief only to the relatively few. 
This Part first examines how individual narratives can play an important role in 
spurring reform. It then considers the risk that relief efforts may appear too 
individualized and create highly burdensome barriers to relief.  
A. Illustrating the Stakes 
Extraordinary individuals often spur legal reform. As the leader of the 
NAACP’s Legal Defense and Education Fund, Thurgood Marshall famously 
permitted the organization to represent only those he believed were obviously 
innocent.58 By focusing on the “actually innocent,” the Innocence Movement 
itself focuses on a subset of those serving long prison sentences. This, in turn, 
demonstrates how the safeguards of criminal procedure can utterly fail.59 
Likewise, death penalty jurisprudence reflects the view that capital cases require 
special treatment, precisely because defendants face uniquely high stakes.60 The 
strategy also extends well beyond the criminal justice system. Some immigrant 
advocates, for instance, have chosen to focus on the so-called “Dreamers” as a 
way to spur comprehensive immigration reform.61 
Defendants with compelling personal narratives have the potential to illustrate 
why disproportionate penalties are so harmful. One version of the strategy 
focuses on defendants’ accomplishments. This strategy can be effective for those 
convicted of misdemeanors and felonies alike. Consider Reginald Dwayne 
 
58 GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE: THURGOOD MARSHALL, THE GROVELAND BOYS, 
AND THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA 48-49 (2012) (discussing Thurgood Marshall’s “careful 
selection of the plaintiffs” based on their apparent innocence). 
59 For a critique of this approach, see Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. 
REV. 1083, 1089 (2011) (identifying one danger of Innocence Movement as “creation of an 
‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality, whereby the public identifies with the actually innocent ‘good’ 
people and vilifies other wrongly convicted ‘bad’ people who have been convicted in violation 
of their constitutional rights”); Jenny Roberts, The Innocence Movement and Misdemeanors, 
98 B.U. L. REV. 779, 784, 815-16 (2018). 
60 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion) (relying 
on proposition that death is different); Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The 
Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
1145, 1148-49 (2009) (criticizing “two-track jurisprudence” for death cases versus other 
cases); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two 
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 370-71 
(1995). 
61 Sameer Ashar, Movement Lawyers in the Fight for Immigrant Rights, 64 UCLA L. REV. 
1464, 1469-73 (2017). 
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Betts, who garnered a remarkable array of accomplishments after his conviction 
as a teenager: He became an acclaimed writer, excelled in college, “started a 
family, held a Radcliffe Fellowship at Harvard, earned a law degree from Yale, 
received an NAACP Image Award, [gave] talks at schools, prisons, and 
conferences around the country,” worked for a public defender’s office, and 
passed a bar exam.62 His felony conviction at age sixteen nonetheless posed a 
barrier to meeting the character and fitness requirements for admission to the 
Connecticut Bar.63 Betts’s case drew media attention precisely because he had 
accomplished so much.64 His story invites the question: If someone so 
accomplished faces barriers to work so long after finishing his sentence, then 
what about everyone else?  
Other accounts emphasize severe consequences triggered by relatively 
common conduct. Shanta Sweatt, for instance, was evicted from public housing 
after police discovered a small amount of marijuana in her apartment.65 
According to Sweatt, an ex-boyfriend hid the marijuana without her 
knowledge.66 Her criminal case ended in a misdemeanor marijuana possession 
plea that did not involve any prison time.67 She did, however, lose her home and 
incurred well over $2000 in fines, fees, and nonrefundable payments to a bail 
bondsman.68 The media account illustrated how the combined civil and criminal 
penalties appeared grossly disproportionate, given the facts. 
 
62 Nathan J. Robinson, Nothing Will Ever Be Enough, CURRENT AFFAIRS (Aug. 4, 2017), 
https://www.currentaffairs.org/2017/08/nothing-will-ever-be-enough [https://perma.cc/JN3 
F-KWXH] (“Former prisoners do not get much more ‘rehabilitated’ than Reginald Dwayne 
Betts.”). 
63 Id. (explaining how Betts received letter from Connecticut Bar that he did not have 
“requisite ‘character and fitness’ to practice law” because of his felony conviction from nearly 
twenty years earlier). He ultimately was admitted to the Bar. Nicholas Dawidoff, A Poet, with 
Prison Behind Him, Becomes an Attorney, NEW YORKER (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.new 
yorker.com/books/page-turner/a-poet-with-prison-behind-him-becomes-an-attorney [https:// 
perma.cc/JVS7-JDPZ]. 
64 See Dawidoff, supra note 63; Elisa Gonzalez, A Decade After Prison, a Poet Studies for 
the Bar Exam, NEW YORKER (June 30, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-
turner/a-decade-after-prison-a-poet-studies-for-the-bar-exam [https://perma.cc/5F57-M3T 
R]; The Current Affairs Interview: R. Dwayne Betts, CURRENT AFFAIRS (July 27, 2016), 
https://www.currentaffairs.org/2016/06/the-current-affairs-interview-r-dwayne-betts [https:// 
perma.cc/G6PJ-WVVY]. 
65 Emily Yoffe, Innocence Is Irrelevant, ATLANTIC, Sept. 2017, at 68, https://www.the 
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171/ [https://perma.cc/33 
LY-UFQB]. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 69. 
68 Id. at 68-69. 
  
2018] PROPORTIONALITY AND OTHER MISDEMEANOR MYTHS 967 
 
A focus on compelling cases, like Sweatt’s, can pay dividends. It permits 
public defenders and advocacy organizations to focus their efforts.69 It often has 
tactical rewards. It can defray opposition and illustrate the stakes. The narratives 
of compelling individuals also exert a powerful psychological effect—they have 
the power to “move[] and energize[] people in a way that empirical data” might 
not.70 
The strategy can play an important role in triggering doctrinal change. One 
important example is the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,71 
which expanded the minimum guarantees of the Sixth Amendment and held that 
defense attorneys must warn defendants if their plea agreement will trigger 
mandatory deportation.72 Jose Padilla, a longtime U.S. permanent resident and 
military veteran, had entered what his defense attorney assured him was an 
“immigration safe” plea, only to find out later that his attorney got it wrong.73 
Not only was there a possibility that Padilla would be deported, deportation was, 
in fact, mandatory.74 Padilla argued that if he had known the full consequences 
of accepting the plea, he would have rejected it and gone to trial.75 He sought to 
vacate his plea, arguing that he had been deprived of effective assistance of 
counsel.76 
The Supreme Court agreed. Given the severity of deportation and its 
enmeshed relationship with the criminal process, the Court held that defense 
attorneys have a Sixth Amendment duty to warn defendants when their pleas 
will trigger mandatory deportation.77 Referral to an immigration attorney does 
not pass muster.78 In reaching this holding, the Court conceptualized deportation 
as a uniquely severe penalty.79 The Court also observed that some defendants 
may be able to plea bargain “creatively” to avoid mandatory deportation.80 
 
69 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2464, 2480 (2004); Joe, supra note 8, at 779-91 (discussing need for public defenders to 
prioritize caseloads). 
70 Susan A. Bandes, Framing Wrongful Convictions, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 5, 9 (discussing 
how stories of innocent clients helped develop anger around innocent people being sent to 
death row). 
71 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
72 Id. at 374. 
73 Id. at 359 (noting that Padilla claimed that “his counsel not only failed to advise him of 
[deportation] prior to his entering the plea, but also told him that he ‘did not have to worry 
about immigration status since he had been in the country so long’”). 
74 Id. at 359-64 (discussing changes in immigration law that expanded grounds for 
deportation and that removed procedural protections designed to prevent unjust deportations). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 359. 
77 Id. at 367. 
78 Id. at 370-71, 385. 
79 Id. at 365. 
80 Id. at 373. 
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The Padilla holding applies across the board to defendants who face 
mandatory deportation. It applies to those who might be able to craft 
immigration safe pleas, as well as to those who almost certainly cannot.81 Padilla 
himself, for instance, had limited options in seeking a plea that did not trigger 
mandatory deportation. Padilla had not committed a minor misdemeanor; he had 
transported over a thousand pounds of marijuana.82 The Class C felony triggered 
a sentence range of five to ten years in prison.83 As Professor Darryl Brown has 
observed, given the relevant statutes at issue and the nature of his crime, it is 
unlikely prosecutors could have brought alternative charges that would not have 
triggered deportation.84 
Whether an immigrant defendant is actually likely to craft an immigration-
safe plea, however, does not affect a defense attorney’s obligations under 
Padilla. Similarly, while immigrant narratives played a powerful role in 
depicting deportation as uniquely severe, they had no impact on the actual 
holding.85 The majority opinion opened by observing that Padilla had been a 
lawful permanent resident for forty years and had served in the U.S. military in 
Vietnam.86 In the Supreme Court briefing, advocates highlighted similar 
narratives of immigrants with long-standing ties to the United States who 
unknowingly pleaded to minor offenses that triggered deportation.87 The 
strategy illustrated how deportation could function as a far more severe penalty 
than the criminal sanction.88 The examples illuminated the stakes, but they 
played no role in the opinion’s reach. All lawful permanent residents are entitled 
 
81 Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1401 
(2011) (observing that, since many drug crimes trigger deportation, it is unlikely that Padilla 
would have, in fact, been able to plead to another equivalent or lesser charge that accurately 
described nature of his offense). 
82 Id. at 1400. 
83 Id. at 1401. 
84 Id. 
85 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374 (“The severity of deportation . . . only underscores how critical 
it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation.”). 
86 Id. at 359. 
87 See generally Brief for Amici Curiae Asian American Justice Center, Mexican 
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and Other Immigrants’ Rights Organizations 
in Support of Petitioner, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 
1567358 [hereinafter Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al.]; HIROSHI MOTOMURA, 
IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW (2006) (discussing concept of “immigration as affiliation,” 
as recognizing individual’s long-term ties to their community as basis for recognizing 
citizenship rights). 
88 Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. 1705, 1739 (2011) (arguing that deportation following criminal offense is inconsistent 
with certain sentencing principles); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1683, 1732 (2009). 
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to be warned if their pleas trigger mandatory deportation, regardless of their 
length of U.S. residence.89 
B. The Risk of Normalizing a Dysfunctional System 
In recent years, important initiatives have attempted to address 
disproportionate collateral consequences. These initiatives take a variety of 
forms, ranging from administrative relief mechanisms to formalized 
prosecutorial discretion. It is an exciting moment for reform, one that reflects 
growing awareness of the high cost of both misdemeanors and collateral 
consequences. Emerging initiatives hold great promise. Too often, however, 
their promise is limited by burdensome criteria that do little to address the many 
structural failures of the misdemeanor system. 
To be clear, lackluster reforms exist for a variety of reasons. They may appear 
politically palatable or administratively convenient. It is much easier to focus on 
the few rather than make systemic change. The problem arises when relief 
mechanisms appear designed for a fictional ideal candidate. This dynamic 
unfolds when relief efforts are discretionary and rare. laden with procedural 
hurdles, or appear to assume that collateral consequences as a general matter are 
justified. 
Existing relief mechanisms are few and far between. Consider the pardon 
power, the oldest form of relief. It is provided for in the U.S. Constitution and 
in virtually every state constitution.90 Nonetheless, it is rarely used.91 Very few 
federal pardons have been granted in recent years.92 Similarly, the majority of 
states rarely grant pardons.93 In many states, the pardon process is highly 
discretionary and administered by the governor.94 
 
89 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374. 
90 MARGARET LOVE, JOSH GAINES & JENNY OSBORNE, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. 
CTR., FORGIVING AND FORGETTING IN AMERICAN JUSTICE: A 50-STATE GUIDE TO 
EXPUNGEMENT AND RESTORATION OF RIGHTS 4-5 (rev. 2018), https://www.ali.org/media/ 
filer_public/4b/8b/4b8b2744-043d-41b3-b8b8-3a7d3988a353/forgiving_forgetting_jan_201 
8_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQK8-RU3Z]. 
91 Id. at 4 (describing pardon as “shadow of its once-robust self”); Rachel E. Barkow, 
Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 807 
(2015) (arguing that despite being “uniquely powerful” tool, federal clemency power risks 
falling into desuetude). 
92 LOVE, GAINES & OSBORNE, supra note 90, at 6 (“The number of presidential pardons 
granted in recent years is small compared to the number of applications that are filed each 
year, and there has been only one pardon granted to a D.C. Code offender in the past two 
decades.”). 
93 Id. at 5 (showing that in only fourteen states were pardons frequent and regular: 
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and South Dakota). 
94 Id. at 4 (“In most of the states in which pardons are granted on a routine basis, the 
governor either has marginal involvement in the pardon process, or shares power with other 
executive officials.”). 
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Similarly, statutory mechanisms of relief, such as certificates of relief or 
expungements, are rarely granted in many jurisdictions.95 There are important 
differences between these relief mechanisms: expungement and sealing are 
designed to restrict access to a record, while mechanisms such as certificates of 
relief are designed to reduce the impact of a record.96 For our purposes, the key 
point is that these mechanisms are rare, particularly when compared to the size 
of the U.S. criminal justice system.  
Many mechanisms include eligibility restrictions that make them practically 
inaccessible or of limited use. Judging from administrative relief mechanisms, 
the ideal candidate appears to have extra cash, ample time, and the ability to 
navigate considerable procedural hurdles. Some jurisdictions require defendants 
to pay fees of several hundred dollars to merely file a petition to seek relief. For 
example, Alabama requires a fee of $30097 and Minnesota requires a fee of 
$285.98 Jurisdictions may also require applicants whose petitions contain 
technical filing errors to pay to refile.99  
It is not uncommon for jurisdictions that offer relief to impose waiting periods 
of three or more years before a misdemeanor conviction is eligible for sealing or 
expungement.100 Some jurisdictions also require petitioners to submit to a 
 
95 See id. at 14-17 (discussing infrequent use of these mechanisms despite their availability 
in most states). 
96 See id. at 7, 9 (“[W]ords like ‘sealing’ and ‘expungement’ have no fixed meaning, and 
are interpreted and applied differently from state to state. In some states sealed records may 
be closed to private parties only, in others public employers and licensing boards may also be 
denied access, and in still others, records may no longer be available even to law enforcement 
without a court order.”). 
97 ALA. CODE § 15-21-1 (2018) (providing for expungement of misdemeanor 
nonconvictions); id. § 15-21-4. 
98 MINN. STAT. § 357.021(2) (2018). Those found to be indigent may seek a fee waiver. 
Id. § 357.021(6) (“Upon a showing of indigency or undue hardship upon the convicted 
person’s immediate family, the sentencing court may authorize payment of the surcharge in 
installments.”). 
99 Joshua Gaines & Margaret Colgate Love, Expungement in Indiana—a Radical 
Experiment and How It Is Working So Far, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (Dec. 21, 
2017), http://ccresourcecenter.org/2017/12/21/expungement-in-indiana-a-radical-experimen 
t-and-how-it-is-working-so-far/ [https://perma.cc/44VV-HW4J]. An important new resource, 
the Restoration of Rights Project, provides a detailed fifty-state comparison of relief 
mechanisms and eligibility requirements. See Restoration of Rights Project, COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., http://ccresourcecenter.org/restoration [https://perma.cc/484S-
V2SH ] (last visited Apr. 28, 2018). 
100 By way of example, Maryland imposes a ten-year waiting period after the completion 
of all conditions of the sentence before certain enumerated misdemeanors are eligible for 
expungement. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-110(C)(1) (West 2018). It imposes a three-
year waiting period for sealing of conviction records after completion of all conditions of the 
sentence before certain enumerated non-violent misdemeanors are eligible for “shielding,” 
which is the functional equivalent of sealing in many jurisdictions. Id. § 10-301(a), (f). 
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hearing and pay administrative fees for the hearing.101 In some cases, petitioners 
must seek the agreement from prosecutors before judges may seal records.102 
In dozens of jurisdictions, defendants must petition for relief even from 
records of arrests that did not result in conviction.103 This approach is 
inconsistent with the presumption that an arrest alone is not indicative of guilt.104 
By making arrests that did not result in conviction visible on court records, states 
ensure that arrests alone will continue to have long-term consequences, 
including by restricting the arrested individual’s access to work or housing. As 
a formal matter, the dismissed arrest carries no legal weight. As a practical 
matter, however, the arrest functions as a meaningful marker, one that is 
virtually certain to deny opportunities. 
Arizona represents a particularly burdensome approach. It requires a person 
who is “wrongfully arrested, indicted or otherwise charged for any crime,” to 
petition for relief and appear at a hearing.105 A judge exercises the discretion to 
issue an order “requiring the entry [on all court records, police records, and any 
other records] that the person has been cleared” if the judge “believes that justice 
will be served by such entry.”106 In other words, those who believe they have 
been wrongfully arrested must demonstrate that the arrest was unlawful or 
otherwise without basis. This, in itself, is a significant burden. Some defendants 
may not know whether the arrest was lawful. Unlike police officers, arrested 
individuals are not expected to be familiar with the factors that make arrests 
 
Colorado imposes a three-year waiting period after the final disposition of a petty offense and 
restricts eligibility to those who have not been charged with any offenses during the 
intervening time period. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-708(1)(A) (2017). Illinois imposes a 
three-year waiting period for most misdemeanors; arrests that were dismissed do not have a 
waiting period, and misdemeanor arrests that resulted in supervision or probation have waiting 
periods of two to five years. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2630/5.2 (2017). Kentucky imposes a five-
year waiting period and also requires a hearing and payment of a $100 fee. KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 431.078(2) (West 2018). 
For detailed fifty-state profiles discussing these restrictions, see LOVE, GAINES & OSBORNE, 
supra note 90, at 27-68; see also Restoration of Rights Project, supra note 99. 
101 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-708(III)(b) (2017) (imposing $200 fee); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 431.078(7) (West 2018) (imposing $100 fee). 
102 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(d) (West 2018) (requiring concurrence of 
prosecuting attorney before judge may seal non-conviction records). 
103 LOVE, GAINES & OSBORNE, supra note 90, at 11, 84-111 (noting “distressingly large 
number of states” take this approach, and providing fifty-state summary that explains each 
state’s treatment of non-conviction records). 
104 Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957) (“The mere fact that a man 
has been arrested has very little, if any, probative value in showing that he has engaged in any 
misconduct. An arrest shows nothing more than that someone probably suspected the person 
apprehended of an offense.” (footnote omitted)); Jain, supra note 21, at 816 n.25 (discussing 
that arrest, in theory, is not indicative of guilt). 
105 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4051(A) (2017). 
106 Id. § 13-4051(B). 
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lawful—and even then, police officers regularly get it wrong.107 Those who have 
experienced negative encounters with the police may also be skeptical of the 
ability of the legal system to offer relief.108  
Burdensome procedures also undermine the efficacy of relief. Relief efforts 
that require prosecutors’ consent further increase prosecutorial workloads. As a 
result, prosecutors may not be able to respond or they may routinely deny 
consent.109 Similarly, legal aid providers have few extra resources for processing 
petitions for relief.110 Indiana, which passed a uniquely broad relief act in 
2013,111 provides an important window into the promise of relief efforts, as well 
as some of their administrative challenges. Indiana has processed thousands of 
petitions for relief since the law was passed.112 However, demand has 
outstripped the ability of legal aid providers to provide services, and some have 
been compelled to freeze expungement intake periodically due to overwhelming 
demand.113 
Administrative hurdles too often continue the procedural hassle of 
misdemeanor courts. As Professor Malcolm Feeley developed in his seminal 
work, some defendants take quick misdemeanor pleas precisely because they 
want to avoid the “process costs” associated with repeated and stigmatizing 
court dates.114 Others end up with heightened penalties because they are unable 
to comply with the process of monitoring—repeated visits with probation 
officers, drug testing, and compliance with various programs—that is part and 
parcel of the court-ordered supervision process after low-level arrests.115 Relief 
 
107 See, e.g., William Glaberson, Long Fight Ends over Arrests for Loitering, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 7, 2012, at A21 (describing New York City’s practice of arresting thousands of 
individuals for loitering long after relevant statute had been declared unconstitutional, and 
reporting that police continued to make unlawful arrests under statute at rate of ten per week 
even decade after law had been struck down). 
108 Monica Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE 
L.J. 2054, 2085-86 (2017) (discussing concept of “legal estrangement” as explaining why 
African-American communities “are nonetheless structurally ostracized through law’s ideals 
and priorities”). 
109 Gaines & Love, supra note 99 (describing some counties that take this approach). 
110 Id. 
111 IND. CODE § 35-38-9-1 (2017) (addressing applications for people whose arrest did not 
result in conviction). The Second Chance Relief Act authorizes a number of different forms 
of relief, including relief that limits public access to many records of arrests and convictions. 
See id. 
112 Gaines & Love, supra note 99. 
113 Id. 
114 See generally FEELEY, supra note 10 (conceptualizing misdemeanor “process” as 
punishment). 
115 See Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of 
Recidivism, 104 GEO. L.J. 291, 300-14, 316-17, 321, 324-26 (2016) (discussing wide range 
of conditions imposed through probation process and modes of enforcement, including 
meetings with probation officers and drug testing). 
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mechanisms that require defendants to endure waiting periods, petition for relief, 
secure the consent of various actors, pay fees, and proceed through a hearing 
effectively continue this process. They make relief contingent on the record 
holder’s compliance with management mechanisms, rather than asking if the 
initial process was justified. 
This approach is backwards. Particularly in the context of a mere arrest, it is 
the state’s burden to demonstrate that the defendant broke the law, not the other 
way around. Administrative efforts that require arrested individuals to come 
forward, proceed through a hearing, and make the case for relief flip the burden 
on its head. If the purpose of backend relief mechanisms is to prevent recidivism 
or ameliorate unjustified harm, blanket waiting periods miss the mark. They 
offer no relief for those who face an immediate barrier to obtaining work because 
of an arrest record.  
Waiting periods can pose more than a procedural hurdle. They may ultimately 
foreclose relief. Some jurisdictions restrict relief to petitioners who have not 
been charged with any offense during the waiting period.116 This approach risks 
penalizing those who live in communities where they are more likely to be 
arrested because of factors other than culpability. Evidence from Chicago, 
Ferguson, New York City, and other localities has shown that arrest rates can 
systemically reflect race rather than legitimate law enforcement concerns.117 
This creates the risk that racial biases in policing practices will ultimately 
foreclose relief. 
In some cases, relief efforts explicitly endorse the legitimacy of misdemeanor 
outcomes as a whole, even as they offer relief to a few. Consider prosecutorial 
policies designed to address disproportionate collateral consequences. A 
minority of prosecutors’ offices have taken steps to publish guidance about how 
collateral consequences affect charging and plea bargaining decisions. Professor 
Ingrid Eagly recently examined four California offices that have taken steps to 
 
116 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-708 (West 2017). For a list of states that take 
this approach, see the fifty-state profile provided by LOVE, GAINES & OSBORNE, supra note 
90, at 27-68. 
117 See Jason Meisner & Annie Sweney, Was Racial Profiling Behind ATF Stash House 
Stings? Chicago Judges to Take up Landmark Case Today, CHI. TRIBUNE (Dec. 13, 2017), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-atf-stash-house-hearing-201712 
11-story.html (discussing expert testimony by Professor Jeffrey Fagan that “minorities were 
‘substantially more likely’ than similarly situated whites to be targeted” in certain sting 
operations); see also Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, 
Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 477-78 (2000) (describing 
how minorities were subject to stop and frisk in New York City to greater extent than whites 
in late 1990s). See generally DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attach 
ments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZHQ5-ASQF] 
(describing racial bias in policing practices). 
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adopt “immigrant protective” policies in criminal justice.118 These offices take 
affirmative steps to issue policies explaining how prosecutors should consider 
collateral consequences in misdemeanor plea bargaining and charging 
decisions.119 The approach represents an important step in recognizing how 
collateral consequences can undercut law enforcement aims. Yet, even these 
offices—frequently referred to as “sanctuary jurisdictions”—adopt a relatively 
narrow approach to recognizing collateral consequences.120 Two offices 
expressly state that collateral consequences are “appropriate” or “just” and that 
prosecutors should deviate from their standard approach only in unusual 
circumstances.121 All the offices require some showing of disproportionality in 
order to justify deviating from the standard charging or plea bargaining 
approach.122  
One could reasonably wonder why collateral consequences following 
misdemeanor convictions are viewed as just and appropriate. Collateral 
consequences take a number of different forms. Some bear no apparent 
relationship to public safety. Given the sheer number of collateral consequences 
that exist today, it is hard to justify a blanket rule. This is particularly true when 
 
118 Eagly, supra note 40, at 249, 266-71 (discussing policies in Alameda, Los Angeles, 
Santa Clara, and Ventura counties). 
119 Id. at 264-71. For a discussion of how criminal prosecutors exercise “de facto” power 
over immigration outcomes, see Lee, supra note 44, at 559-63. 
120 For explanations of why the popular term “sanctuary” is misleading, see, for example, 
Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 1197, 1199 (distinguishing legislative response by local cities and states from historic 
concept of church-based sanctuary); Eisha Jain, Understanding Immigrant Protective Policies 
in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 161, 163-64 (2017) (highlighting that policies 
do not seek to shield immigrants from deportation except in limited circumstances and they 
are not motivated by commitment to concept of sanctuary); Lasch et al., supra note 40, at 41 
(describing “sanctuary” jurisdictions as encompassing “truly a kaleidoscope of policy 
actions”). See generally Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State 
Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cities After Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13 
(2016) (conceptualizing “sanctuary” policies as form of uncooperative federalism). 
121 See Eagly, supra note 40, at 267-69. The Los Angeles County policy, for instance, 
states that in “many” cases “the adverse collateral consequences are appropriate and just” and 
that departures from normal settlement policy should be made only in “unusual or 
extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 267-68 (quoting Special Directive 03-04 from Steve 
Cooley, L.A. Dist. Attorney, to all Deputy District Attorneys 1-2 (Sept. 25, 2003)). Similarly, 
the Ventura County policy states, “[c]ollateral consequences are generally a normal and just 
consequence of a criminal conviction.” Id. at 268 (quoting Office of the Dist. Attorney, Cty. 
of Ventura, Legal Policies Manual § 4.01(A)(1) (Dec. 31, 2014)). 
122 Id. (quoting Special Directive 03-04 from Steve Cooley, supra note 121, at 1-2); see 
also id. at 268-69 (quoting policies from Los Angeles, Santa Clara, and Ventura counties 
whose language suggests disproportionality is key factor in determining whether to account 
for collateral consequences). 
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misdemeanors, rather than felonies, trigger the “drastic measure” of 
deportation.123  
A narrow focus on any given defendant’s circumstances—meaning whether 
or not any given defendant deserves relief—may risk obscuring the systemic 
problems with misdemeanor processing. One criticism of immigrant-protective 
policies in criminal justice, for instance, is that those facing deportation either 
do not deserve relief, or that policies designed to ameliorate the likelihood of 
deportation actually privilege immigrant defendants over similarly situated U.S. 
citizens.124 Similar arguments apply to collateral consequences in other contexts. 
Some judges view collateral consequences as important to sentencing,125 while 
others have described consideration of collateral consequences as tantamount to 
a “middle class” sentencing discount.126 The latter argument is two-fold. First, 
if the focus is on an individual’s particular circumstances, then those who can 
demonstrate immediate harm to their work or educational prospects may be 
more likely to secure better outcomes than others who committed similar 
offenses.127 Second, it creates the risk that outcomes reflect judges’ sympathies 
rather than considerations about culpability.128 
 
123 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360-64 (2010) (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. 
Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)) (discussing changes in immigration law that greatly expanded 
number of crimes that triggered deportation). 
124 See, e.g., Justin Fenton, Prosecutors Cautioned over Charging Immigrants, BALT. SUN, 
Apr. 29, 2017, at A1 (quoting Attorney General Jeff Sessions as criticizing district attorneys 
who “openly brag about not charging cases appropriately” and for “advertis[ing] that they will 
charge a criminal alien with a lesser offense than presumably they would charge a United 
States citizen”); see also Chin, supra note 50, at 1421 (discussing how “effects of immigration 
status on criminal cases can roughly be divided into two categories”: those that impose 
disadvantages and those that advantage immigrants as compared to U.S. citizens). 
125 See, e.g., United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 189, 193-94 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(imposing sentence consisting principally of single year of probation, rather than 
recommended sentence of two years imprisonment and supervised release for three years 
thereafter, based on likelihood that defendant would be deterred from career plans). 
126 United States v. Musgrave, 761 F.3d 602, 608 (6th Cir. 2014) (directing district court 
not to consider collateral consequences including those that “would tend to support shorter 
sentences in cases with defendants from privileged backgrounds, who might have more to 
lose” (quoting United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758, 765-66 (6th Cir. 2012))); United States 
v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The Sentencing Guidelines authorize no 
special sentencing discounts on account of economic or social status.”); United States v. 
Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e take this opportunity to emphasize to 
the district judges of this circuit that no ‘middle class’ sentencing discounts are authorized.”). 
127 Stefonek, 179 F.3d at 1038 (arguing that criminals should not be treated more leniently 
“just by virtue of being regularly employed”). 
128 Id. (“It is natural for judges, drawn as they (as we) are from the middle or upper-middle 
class, to sympathize with criminals drawn from the same class.”). 
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The case of David Becker, a high school athlete arrested for sexually 
assaulting two classmates, illustrates both of these possibilities.129 The charges 
against Becker were substantiated, but the judge chose not to enter a conviction 
because the judge viewed the recommended two-year prison sentence, plus 
mandatory sex-offender registration, as too harsh.130 The judge noted how the 
conviction would “slam a lot of doors,” because the defendant would likely not 
“go to college at all.”131 The judge chose to employ a procedural mechanism that 
kept the possibility of conviction open for two years while the defendant served 
probation.132 If the defendant completed probation successfully, he would be 
eligible to seal his record.133 
One critique of this approach is that it risks creating systemic inequality.134 
The factors that made Becker compelling to the judge, such as his diminished 
college prospects, also created the risk of bias. Individual or case-by-case relief 
efforts also risk creating the perception that criminal charges are not being taken 
seriously enough. The analysis becomes reduced to whether a particular 
individual deserves relief, rather than whether penalties like deportation or loss 
of access to college or work are appropriate judgments to be made through the 
misdemeanor justice system.  
III. ADDRESSING THE MISDEMEANOR MYTHS 
This Part raises two related strategies for how to reframe relief efforts to 
address the structural problems that pervade misdemeanor justice. First, in 
evaluating the need for relief, decisionmakers should focus on how a “typical” 
misdemeanant experiences punishment, including both criminal and 
noncriminal penalties. Second, the focus should be on the state’s rationale for 
triggering harm. The focus ought to be on whether there is a compelling penal 
rationale for the penalty in the first place, and whether the penalty was imposed 
with adequate notice and procedural safeguards, rather than on whether the 
defendant has demonstrated a compelling rationale for relief. Taking this 
 
129 See Christine Hauser, Judge’s Sentencing in Massachusetts Sexual Assault Case 
Reignites Debate on Privilege, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/08/25/us/david-becker-massachusetts-sexual-assault.html. 
130 Id.; Joshua Gaines, When Collateral Consequences Drive the Sentence: The David 
Becker Case, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (Sept. 15, 2016), http://ccresource 
center.org/2016/09/15/when-collateral-consequences-drive-the-sentence-the-david-becker-
case/ [https://perma.cc/Q69H-W3JS]. 
131 Gaines, supra note 130. 
132 Id. (explaining “continuance without a finding” mechanism employed in defendant’s 
case). 
133 Id. 
134 See Hauser, supra note 129 (“The sexual assault case is one of several recent episodes 
that activists say show a troubling trend toward lenient punishment for young white 
perpetrators.”). 
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approach would lead to more routine and automatic avenues for relief, as 
opposed to discretionary and sporadic ones. 
A. Reconceptualizing the Harm 
One way to evaluate the need for reform is to focus on how the misdemeanor 
system affects a “typical” misdemeneant. The misdemeanor system is flawed for 
a number of reasons. Sometimes, the problem is police who lie or choose to 
pursue petty misdemeanor charges that create more harm than good.135 These 
problems, however, as serious as they are, represent just part of the problem with 
misdemeanor justice. Even when law enforcement pursues misdemeanor arrests 
that are both lawful and desirable, they lack the ability to control many damaging 
penalties triggered by low-level arrests. Law enforcement can control what types 
of charges are brought and the disposition, but they lack the ability to control 
important consequences of a criminal record.  
This dynamic is the product of overworked misdemeanor courts, understaffed 
defense attorneys, and the state’s decision to make criminal records inexpensive 
and easy to access. In the misdemeanor system, the state too often abdicates 
responsibility for seeking outcomes that comport with retributivist or deterrence-
based rationales for criminal punishment.136 Deterrence assumes that informed 
defendants can make a rational judgment that unlawful behavior is not worth the 
risk of punishment.137 Yet, given that so many penalties are hidden from view—
so that even law enforcement officers are unaware of them at the time of an 
arrest or conviction—defendants cannot make a rational decision to be deterred. 
From a retributivist perspective, the criminal sanction is meant to be the sum 
total of the punishment. Yet, with misdemeanors, the formal sanction is just one 
aspect of the harm. Even low-level penalties risk imposing far more harm than 
is retributively justified, given the impact of the record.138 Defendants who take 
quick pleas may believe that they are choosing the least harmful alternative and 
find out after the fact that the conviction or even the arrest alone carries 
significant penalties. Misdemeanor reform must, as a central goal, address these 
dynamics.  
 
135 See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 792-95 
(2012) (discussing need for policing practices that are “harm-efficient,” not merely lawful). 
136 See Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: 
The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 180-81. 
137 Id. (“Importantly, the effectiveness of deterrence is premised on the actor’s knowledge 
of the sanctions themselves and an ability to weigh not only the severity of the sanction with 
which he or she will be met, but also the likelihood of being met with that sanction.”). 
138 Jenny Roberts, Informed Misdemeanor Sentencing, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 180, 191-
96 (2017) (arguing that in misdemeanor context, underlying justifications for punishment are 
often unclear, and “for truly low-level misdemeanor offenses, any punishment may be 
unjustified”). 
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B. Reframing Relief 
Relief mechanisms should ask whether there is a compelling penal rationale 
for the penalty in the first place, and whether the penalty was imposed with 
adequate notice and procedural safeguards. In asking this question, relief 
mechanisms should account for the growing empirical work demonstrating how 
even minor contact with the criminal justice system can have long-lasting 
consequences. The primary question should be whether there is a compelling 
penal rationale for the penalty, rather than whether the defendant can 
demonstrate hardship or good character. For penalties that are not a formal part 
of the criminal punishment, it should be the state’s burden to explain how the 
civil penalty is tailored to promote a legitimate law enforcement goal and also 
to explain that the penalty was put in place through a fair process, including 
adequate notice. Adopting this approach means more automatic and routine 
opportunities for relief, rather than discretionary and sporadic ones.  
Law enforement decisions ought to be made in light of the likelihood that a 
defendant may very well face serious penalties from even a minor arrest. 
Important models for this approach already exist. Some prosecutors have already 
begun to consider “reentry” in expansive terms. Although reentry is often 
conceptualized as the process of assisting former prisoners with their transition 
back into society, more recent work considers reentry as a process that starts 
with arrest.139 Consistent with this view, prosecutors should routinely consider 
whether minor charges are likely to trigger disproportionate collateral 
consequences.  
In keeping with the principle that a mere arrest is not indicative of guilt, a 
number of states automatically expunge arrests that do not result in 
conviction.140 This approach also recognizes that petitioning for relief may itself 
be prohibitively burdensome for record holders.141  
Some prosecutors also take important steps to make relief after a conviction 
routine. In San Diego and San Francisco, the prosecutors’ offices announced that 
they would automatically erase thousands of marijuana convictions, going back 
 
139 N.Y. UNIV. CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL LAW, DISRUPTING THE CYCLE: 
REIMAGINING THE PROSECUTOR’S ROLE IN REENTRY 14 (2017), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/ 
default/files/upload_documents/CACL%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/54UV-GUMZ]. 
140 LOVE, GAINES & OSBORNE, supra note 90, at 14. 
141 Misdemeanants have limited bargaining power, which contributes to the pressure to 
accept quick pleas. As Professors Jenny Roberts and Michelle Alexander have written, if 
misdemeanants engaged in a large-scale refusal to plea bargain and instead demanded trials, 
that would “crash” the misdemeanor system as we know it. Jenny Roberts, Crashing the 
Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1094-1100 (2013) (arguing that if court 
system is made to feel costs of full adjudication of misdemeanors, this may create legislative 
change); Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 11, 2012, at SR5. 
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forty years.142 In Marion County, the most populous county in Indiana, 
prosecutors follow a policy of routinely supporting relief procedures, for 
instance, by adopting policies designed to streamline review.143 Notably, 
prosecutors do not inquire about why petitioners seek expungements.144 Instead, 
prosecutors presume that recordholders have valid reasons for seeking relief and 
that relief will contribute to reintegration.145 
Similarly, some jurisdictions have taken important steps to normalize the 
administration of relief through pardons. Approximately fourteen states issue 
“[r]egular and frequent” pardons.146 These states treat relief as routine, rather 
than exceptional.147 Some have taken steps to insulate the pardon process from 
the political process, such as by having the pardon power exercised by a board 
that is independent from the governor.148 This approach is consistent with the 
recognition that if the criminal justice system regularly imposes overbroad 
consequences, the state should routinize how it provides for relief. 
CONCLUSION 
A growing body of scholarship shows how misdemeanor practice bears little 
resemblance to the principles of just punishment that guide criminal law theory. 
It fails to offer defendants the opportunity to contest charges, have a speedy trial, 
or to receive the advice of counsel. Misdemeanors trigger civil penalties that are 
experienced as punishment. This dynamic often unfolds in hidden ways, 
including in ways that work against the aims of law enforcement. 
 
142 Timothy Williams & Thomas Fuller, San Francisco Will Clear Thousands of 
Convictions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/31/us/california-
marijuana-san-francisco.html. 
143 Gaines & Love, supra note 99 (discussing how Marion County’s prosecutor’s office 
has administered Indiana’s recently enacted expungement law). Rather than reviewing 
requests for prosecutorial consent regarding waiver of a waiting period before a petitioner’s 
record is eligible for expungement on an ad hoc basis, a panel comprised of experienced 
prosecutors reviews requests for prosecutorial approval of the waiting period, and it evaluates 
them against established criteria. Prosecutors typically consent to waiving the waiting period 
for relief. Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. (summarizing interview with Marion County Deputy Prosecutor Andrew Fogle, 
who supervises Office’s expungement practices, and describing Office’s practice of assuming 
that petitioners have valid reason for seeking expungement, stating that “employment 
opportunities are given equal standing with those looking to chaperone their children’s field-
trips, improve their self-esteem, or even restore their firearms rights”). 
146 LOVE, GAINES & OSBORNE, supra note 90, at 4-5 (discussing and providing visual of 
states’ pardoning practices). 
147 See id. at 4. 
148 Id. (“In Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, South Carolina, and Idaho, hundreds of 
pardons are granted each year to ordinary people convicted of garden variety crimes who are 
seeking to mitigate the harsh lingering consequences of conviction.”). 
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Too often, efforts at misdemeanor reform fail to recognize disproportionate 
consequences. They require misdemeanants to demonstrate exceptional 
circumstances to make the case for relief. This approach does little to change the 
misdemeanor system. Recognizing the misdemeanor myths—the systemic ways 
that misdemeanor practice deviates from criminal law theory—is an essential 
first step to effecting reform. 
